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Communism and Faachm

HE mflapse of the proletarian movement in Germany 5
complete. The "Daily Worker" may believe that lying,
fabricated repods of the "wonderful struggle of the
German communi
from its readers.
Worker" reader is redly a special psychological type, who

looks for facts instead of interpretations has long ceased
not matter.
The truth is that the collapse of Communism
- was much more complete than the collapse of

octacy went
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down without any resistance,

had not imbued the workers with the
spirit, on which the communists have
But, what has happened t o the r e d u
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did they offer bo the Hitter hod-?
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press, and whost
celebrated in advance in wnununist
Where were these heres when the
took possedon of thcir houses and their prop
were they when the dcdsive moment for which
they said they wwe waiting, atriveti? What sa&ces
did
they make to save their movement? The communist movement went down in defeat witbut stmggl~withoutresistance,
p M y without protest German Comamunism has only one
h e of defense, a line of defeme which communists are loathe
to take openly, but which they are d y taking in their usual
b d k t way, Their defense can only b that to them there is
no Merence between Fascism and Democrwy: that they
have, thunsclvea, contributed PO small part to the victory of
Wtlcr, It was the communists, more than the fascists, who
did sll they could to discrodit, not ody the German Republic,
but the idea of democracp as well; it was the communht~
more than the fascists who did not atop at anything, no
matter how low and disgraceful, to dimedit the Social Democratic movement It was the ~
~
t mores than, the
fascis6 who contindly taught the desperate German masses,
that the source of all their troubles lies in the demomitic
m,that if they could only establish a dictatorship and
rid themselves of such "bourgeois prejudices" as freedom4
justice, democracy, all their problems w d d be solved. "As
regards 'the class content' there a y no distinctions between
damaacy and fascism," declared the communists as late as
January 1932, and another communist @did,at the same
time jeers at Trots@ becatme it acenu that he also believes
in the "lesser mil" accwding to which "Bruening'isnot aa
bad as Hitler, according to which it is not so unpleasant bo
stawe under Brtlening as under Hitler, and infinitely preferable to h hot down by Groener than by Frick." '
This was the famous struggle against fascism which the
coxkmunbts carried on. It consisted in a v h i the
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worktrs that there really was no d&rcnce to workers whether
tbty had democracy I# fascism. The facts are dew and no
amount of conmu& fahiications m hide the truth: Communist propaganda created the psychofogic conditions for
the triumph of Kitl*,
and the communist movement is
paying dearly for it now.
To console their comrades outside of Germany* tht Cornmunist International is not content with fabricating Unewn
from" Germany, it even tries to "ez~plain'*to its adhercats
that what b happening in Germany is d j ia the best intenat of the proletarian d u t i a n . Wbat the victory of
fascism scents to haw aaompE&ed, accodng to the lamt
dedamtion of the Communist I n t e r a a M is simply what
the mmmu&ts wanted to do and could not The d t t t i o n
d the P d & u m of the E. C. C. I. adopted April 1, 1933,
plainly states that it is quite satidea with the achievements
of Hitler. Here is what the Communist Xntefnathaf has to
say on the German ahation:
But the fascist dictatodip, basing itself on armed gangs
of national d s t s and ''Steel Helmets" and ~ W C ing dvil war against the working class, abolishing all the
rights of the proletariat* k at the same time smashing
the social democratic theory that it is W b l e to win
a parliamentary majority by means of elections and to
develop peacefully towards socialism without revolutiott,
It is destroying the d a l democratic theory of dass coflaboration with the bwrgaoisie and the policy of the
'%?sser evilt1and is destroying all the dtmocra* mudma
among the broad massea of workers.

I\

and
The working dam is amally becoming convinced tlutt
the c o n r m ~ t were
s
right when for a nttmber of years
they fought against democratic illusions, the tdd d m
matic policy of the rcsacr evil" and collaboration with
the bowgdde.*
How h l y communist this is! Even now, when it has dftrtd ib grcakst and most ignoble defeat, it finds ame t~
*-,
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against fascism
'"fhia b not c m t c k It is not correct ht,beca
k not the chief m y in the workem'
cial faxism is our chief enemy there."
and he sums up with the following woda:
"From aI1 this, it is clear, that in the p
for the revolution, we direct our chief weapon at this
period against our chief enmy in the working class, Le.,
against sodal fascism.'"
There is nothing new in Gusev'~advice to his c o m m h
Thia has been the communist policy for years. What is b
temthg is that this ad*
war given when the
ob
Hitterism was so near that even the blind could see it, and
that it was given at the verg t h e when the c b m m d n b
raised their false wy for a united front louder &an mer,
Who is r e s p d b l e for the split in the proietarian movemcnt ? T o one who is acquainted even superficially with ths
histwy of post-war Socialism there can be no doubt abotlt thb
answer. Have not the communists time and again poided
themselves on this achievement? But so strong is the power
of lies constantly repeated, that the communists have already
convinced themselves as well as many "impartial" = d i d
(ie., m l e , who art communists and dare not join tht
communist party) that it was the h a l i s t s who split the-

*

mwwllent.

The Communist International was o r g a n i d in M a d
1919. What was its purpose? It was not the &cation of
the miatist movkent, but its splitting up. The Comma&
International could have united within its ranks thc tndts
socialist movement of the world. The Second Intwnatiad
was piactidly nondstent at the time. M y the extnxtm
right wing supported it and the more the proletarian magW
became disillusioned with the war for democraq,the mare
olutimary they bemum. The Indeptndcnt Sdd
Party of Germany, the French Socialist
Sociatit Party, and many other parties,
ing to join the newly orgdzed i
s&dntd

In th. " O o m m ~ a.
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Why? Because the Communist Tntemationd could
them as they were. They had to split first. The
@mad of the t3mmunist I n t e r n a t i d was: You must get
rid, &st of all, of your reformist clement, expel them if you
are in the majority; leave the pa* if you are in the minoriv.
In either case of course, it meant a split. The Communist
International did not want to organize ail d s t s , or even
all communists under its banner. IU ideal was the organization only of "the kt"
the
, "most reliable'' in short, instead
of a mass movement, it wanted an organhation of communist
saints ody. Having organized the saints, it set out to destroy
the sinners still left in the prolemovemenL Following
this beticid line they remained true to their theory that the
proletaxian revdution will be made by a "strong, determined
revolutionary minority".? Where are these revolutionary sainb
now? The present leaders of the Communist International
were still unknown at that time, and those who could not
admit the "reformists1'into the Gmmunist International bc
cause "they are unreliablt and are capable of betraying the
revolution", have all h a m e . h e r s themselves: Trotskp,
Zinoviw, Kamentv, not to speak of dozens of lesser lights.
The real saints who initiated the fight to exterminate the
mliab1e socialist sinners, have all been expelled from the
communist community of saints. Their policy, however, is
*&bit

'

continued even today.
But what about tbe United Froat? Are not the communists constantly damoring for a united front? W e shall
not dwell upon the entirt q u ~ t i o nof a united front here.
The reader will 6nd a d i d o n of it in a pamphlet by Au-t
Tyler, 'The United Front". What interests us is whether the
German communists did redly want a united front. When
the fascist waves began to risc so rapidly that Hitler's victory
seemed imminent, a group of the German Democratic ParQ
had an interview with the l d c r of the German CotpmUPist
Party, Thaelmana, They wanted to learn what chances there
were for a united front against fascism. What did Thaetmann

-
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tell them? H e repeated m e of the ,usual dademus
ments against the Social Democratic Fhrty, and added thst
"an alliance between the Social Demoeratic ParQ of Gtmanp
and the Communist Party of Germany was imp&& w tha
basis of these fa- and also for
of prWplc" For'
"reason of principle" ,thedore the m u n i a t s annot enterinto an alliance with the Sodal -tic
Party. What =
these reasons of principle? Naturally. the theory of sad&?::
fascism. As long as cmmunists hold this theory, no one caa
seriously b e h e in their cry for a united front. Thaefinaan,
as well*as the communists, in general, evqwhtrt, do not
rralire haw ridiculous they appear by talking about a united
front from below. 'We commuaisbs, who r+jcct urg acmd
with the Social Democratic leaders.. repeatedly dedarc."saya
Tbaelmmn, ,"that we are at all times ready for the anti-fascist struggle with the militant Social Democratic and Rcichsbanner comrades, and with the lower militant or@zations."
In other words, the communists will allow militant m w n b
of the Social Democratic Party and the Reichabanner to join
them in their fight against f&,
and as the "real enemf is
not fascism but social fascism, these militant members of the
Social Democratic Party will be allowed to k h t their own
party under the banner of the (=ommudst Party.
This is the United Front that the German Cammunbt

.

ParQ w a n d

-In.

Just as the German
of toleration towards b
socialist movemeat had a
German Social D e m m t i c Party,
who, with grave misgivings, watched the
ism of the German Social Demomats was
bat open criticism was restrained because
German comrades." There were, of cou
were ready to applaud anything that the
did, and to raise t o the dignity of
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the Gennan a d a l b t s were compelled to
the sdaliats who were w scared by Bolto accept anything if only it
revolatioa. Their namber was d
l
.But
ho were witid of the German Sodal Dem*
crab k p t dent, thisl small p u p was very d c u l a t e . They
were so foud in their praises of ewqthhg that the Social
stof Germany did, that many assumed that their
pmks were the offidd attitude of inkmationat s o d i m
tmmh the German S o u d Demomtic Party.
The German Social Democratic Party had tried a new experiment It was an experiment of g m s s - o p p o ~In this
groas-opportunistic qeriment, it departed from most of the
fundamental principles of Marxian Socralrsm Since 1914, it
has practidly given up the Marxian concept of a s s strugg£e and of mdal revolatioa The civil peace proclaimed by
the German Social Democratic Party at the outbreak of the
war, was continued through the period from the German rev*
lution to the victory of the counter-dution. Thrwgh all
these years, when the German Social Democratic Party was
either at the helm of the German Republic, or the most powerful oppoeition party, it followed the principle of civil peace
instead of tbe class struggle. This exptriment in opportunism
was watched anxiously by evwy socialist throughout the
wosld The watch is now at an end. The results are known
to dl. The experiment was a miserable failure.
The underlying principle of the tactics of the Gmnan
Social Democratic Party was that Soddim is a purely politid matter. The term political was again nar~owedduwn
to pure parliamentarism. Socialism will be voted in. There
is nothing more that one can do to attain Socialism than to
vote for d s t candidates. There is nothing for a sodalist
party to do but to conduct election campaigns successfully.
The German Social Democratic Party had educated its members accodhg to this principle. So well were they educated
that nothiig could induce them to betray k k l i a r n at the
Mot h Even after Hitlefcame to power, under conditions
of fascist t m o r , the Soda1 h o m a t i c Party retained its
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voting strength It laat very few

d ib

election. But i
it, when it became

and well organized Social -tic

Party of

trade unions, the

mitted to Fascism, the fact that they submitted without ths .
least resistance, is due to the same &taken conqtion of tbe
purely political socialish The German mde m i o m wem
socialist trade unions. What -tly
was mcant by m&W trade unions? Nothing but that the German trade
were ready to suppuu the mcialist politid campaigns an8
vote for socialist adidam. A socialist anion once manh
'
as it should mean, a proletah organization d y to
its economic power into the iight for S o u a h a But t
b
Geman socialist trsde &on was only r d y b vate bor :
s&t
candidates and forget about it until the next e b tion. That is why some trade union leaders in Getrraany wem
so ready to malte peace with the Hitter regime, and c o i l i h a
peacefully as pure and simple trade unions under hsci&
regime. That this h e f d peace was not made was simply
due to the fact that the Nazi rulers r c h d it.
Adopting the purely political-psrliamcn~view of §aeialism, the Socia D e m m t i c Party, as a consequenct,
bound to place all ita hope on political democracy, T%@
democracy is a powerful weapon in the class strug&$
can be no doubt; that W i t s should defend axad @t far
democracy goes without saying. But the Ga& - &id
Democratic Pasty did not content itself with using d&mtmcy
for Socialism. Instead, it s a d c a d Sodalitrm for & a w .
.
Democracy became, for ik, not a meam to an era$ but sn 4
.
in itself. All distinctions between s d a W d ~ i t a J i &
dcmocracy were abolished. Even the a&
h&that q.
I-
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~~iinitdfaconstantclashoffommwaa
ob-ted.
The aonvidon was fastened upon the masses
that d w there is politid dazmmcy, dl other mtans of
add -e
but voting cease The self evident mth that
it ray IE mccmmy to defend democmcy i M by undernomdc m a n s never entered their heads. Comrade Raphd
Abramovitch, writing on the German tragedy, c x p r e s d himd
f to the effect that the wedmesa of the German S o d
Dcmoaatic Party lay in the fact that the raIing ctasdica had
ceased to fear it. The ntling dasws, aa well well the German
masws, gradually realized that the Soda1 Democrats '2wilf

nevcr WL''
The extent to which this opportunism demwalietd the
German Social Democrats is shown by the fact that a large
part of the party even tried to itrkrpret the p i c t ~ of
y f d m ,
democratically. f i l e r , they said, won a majority at the polls.
We will have to adapt ourselves to the new conditions and
patiently wait until the next electioa If the German Socia
Democratic Party is not now a legal and respectable opposition of his majesty, Adolph Hitler, it is because Hitler did
not waut it. And yet, there was a time when the German
M l Democrats could have prevented the growth of Fascism. They could have d e d F B Swhen
~ it waa ywng,
just as they crashed Bolshevism. "T'he republican Icadtrs,"
and among them sdalista, "were not unaware tbat the forcca
of reaction were growing," testify hiatorha of the German
revolution,* "but they seemed to have tficd to deceive themselves with the thought that the swing to the right meant
only the formation of a constitutional opposition!' If 'amstitutional" it was all right. Demovatic principles demanded
that the reactionary movement be given a chance to grow.
As early as 1919, after the Sparbcist revolt was crashed,
Philip Scheidemann raised the cry that "the enemy is at the
right", but his cry was not heeded.
Of course, there was a left wing in the German Sdal
Dammatic Party. Of wurst, there were many among the
German =cialists who fought against these opportunistic
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tendencies in the Patty. 8
and well disciphed", in
had o strong enough grip
left tendencies to grow and

Social Democratic Party would have taken a
What Now?
For a11 practical p q m e s there is neither a
nor a socialist party in Germany. At present the

Socialism is not dead; it is only stunned
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far

i d the

German Social Democratic Party m
and analyzed. It is, after all, by oar

sh&d

k learn

Towards Reorientation
H E victory of Hitlerism in Germany, and the growth of
fascism in other countries has raised anew the problwn of
democracy in the socialist movement. For a meager few
years it seemed that this problem had been settled once for all.
The proletarian movement all over the world seemed to have
accepted, as final, the division of socialism into democratic and
dictatorial. Of course there was no absolute u n a w i t y , either
among democratic socialists, or among dictatorial socialists
on all points. Democracy, as well as dictatorship, is amenabIe
to wide and varied interpretations. Nevertheless, in broad
outlines, the problem seemed to have been settled.
We are democratic socialists. The victory of Hitler has
not changed our views in this regard. We can not imagine
socialism without democracy. Democracy for us is the most
essential part of socialism. While it is true that the aim of
socialism is to reorganize society on a new economic basis, the
hope of socialism, its source of inspiration, is the human lib-, equality and universal Happiness that will result from
this economic reorganization. With the exception of a handful of socialists, the democratic socialists never confused socialist democracy with bourgeois democracy. We all know,
very well, that real democracy is incompatible with capitalism.
No socialist has ever believed that what is now called democracy is really democracy. We know and realize a11 its defects and limitations, but, since the time of Marx and Engels,
we have come to look upon bourgeois democracy as the best
and most important weapon in our fight for real sociabst
democracy. Together with Engels we can still say, even now
after the victory of Hitlerisrn, "with the successful utilization
of the general franchise, an entirely new method of the pro-

T

letarian seh a come into
isstilloneofthe
The advent of Hitlerkn has
of soda1 democrscy, but it has re
r€asoPingon bourgeois
we have for long yeara put the en
on a wrong and non-Marxian Mi
our premises wen redly srtbjdvc. We asked *VW:
do
we want democracy? and answered : of cotme we dd I We
asked ourselves: do we want to achieve 8dalhm
B e
cratic means ? And we answered:certainly we do.
ourselves: do we want to travel the dcmmtic rmd?a d
answered: yes we do! And it seemed W many of & t&$t
everything was settled, because all we had to do was '& liE&
termine what we wanted Asfr any Gwman or Italian
whether he would prefer to get socidka by dem
ody, and he d l 1 surely answer in the afErmati
Bat, of what avail is his preference for dmif he .&
not even given a chance to voice his preference freely for bbo
democratic way?
The question must be pat objectively htead of abjectively, Instead of asking ourselves what we mu& we.
ought to ask, what will oar enemy compel us to da The
question is not whether we prefer the demomatic way; the
question should be, whether our cnemy will give us a &an&
to travel tbe preferred way. Will not our enemy blthe
desirable way? We are not the only party in the -e,
and we are not the only party to decide what forma the classstraggle shall take. Sodalist tactics are mom often forced
upon socialists by their enemies than chosen by themselvc~.~
This m i s t a h emphasis on the subjective mpcb of the
problem of d e m m c y is directly ftspodble for t
k
velopment d the tendency to make a f e t i d ob -a
a tendency that has brought great harm to the s d & t
m-4
4
m a t . This tendency took root more M y in our .party than anyhere else, aad it Ii, now paying the
for i t
j,
W h a t i s t h i s ~ t ~ o gte8;hsis~s
f ~ ?
...
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& h a It o ~ ~ f 1 o o the
b , fact thst

in -pitalist

!

sociev. It overdemocratic governments never
extra-parliamentary and
i u s t interests. It overot make the use of force
but is itself a coustant dash of forces. I t simply
&wes
force with violence which, of course, arc not the
ents use both.
we had democracy all
our troubles wodd be over, dl our problems solved, if only
we had sufficient patience. They confuse bourgeois democracy
with social democracy, Instead of accepting demomcy as
a means in the fight for d,
they accept it as a substitute for the fight Once we had democracy, no real Sghting
w d d ever be necessary* It never occurred to them that a
time might come when the democratic way would be blocked,
when they would be fought against and would have to fight
back by resorting to undemocratic means. Bmrgcob demis a valuable weapon in the hands of the working class, but it
is a h an instrument of dam domination for the bourgeoisie.
As yet the power is in thc hands of the capitalist class. They
a n use democracy for their purposes, or abdish it if it becomes dangerous for them.
We do not agree with communists that f a d m is a norr
essay, unavoidable stage through which every capitalist
thy must pass on its way to
We deny &e inevitabrlity of fascism, but if it is not inevitable, it surely is probable, and for this probability every s o d b t party must prc
pare. Those socialists who wouId try to I o d i z e the "German
tfagedy" are not d y wrong, they are atso dangerous to the
movement. The b a n tragedy is the tragedy of sadal rcf o d m all over the world,
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If not social reformism then what? Revdution? Imur~Pection? Barricades? Is that what w e are to
fw,
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But, we are remhdtd that Ure~ohrtims
m nok made at *,
and to makt the argument stronger L d n L olkd b this
effect But these arguments arc d y not
We
h o w , and would not dream of denying, that " r ~ 0 ! 1 l i h
are not made at d l " . Neither are fadst comtm-dutbtkm
made at d
l,Both grow out of an impin whkh dfd=
ism finds itself, and both may take on d i g m t mpf&i r w d ~
different circumstances. W e know very well that
revolutions, the m e d uprisings about which the
love to talk, are in advance doomed to failure, No p l party, no matter how strong and well o r g u k d it m y b%,
can be successful in an armed uprising against a mcrdern
state with its modern military teddque, Long ago E q e h
wrote in bis preface to Marx's "Cid War in FranctU&&
"the rebellion of the old style, the street fight behind barricades which up to 1848 had prevailed, has beantiquated." He even warned his readers that uthe raling
by some means or another, would get us where the ri0e pqm
and the saber dashes." The tragic experiences of the urevolutionary uprisings" which were artificially engineered by the
communists have proved the truth of Engeld worda The
Bolshevik revolution in Russia is no proof to the amtrmy,
The Bolshevih fought, ~ o at capitalist state, but n shadow.
Besides, the Bolshevik mvoluion in Russia was the readt d
such unique, specifically Russian circumstances that they
not and wiIl not be rtpeated elsewhere. T o say, as did the international conferenceof the communist oppositionpadat,
now when soda1 reformism is dead the only way to gOdtligll
is "the Russian way" is either to meal r gmm ignorance d
t8c forma that made the Rmiaa revolution posuible, sr simply
to play with words which at present arc f a d h d a , Tht
Russian way is purelp Russian, so & d y
R m h n , that
it can not bt hitatad.
Our dcritidsm of social reformism is not hmmc It &
no revo1ntZona: because it did not o r g m b m e d upThat would not have been nm,ladmq a d d i m h t

-
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Om d k k u n ia that it did not use the oppwt wvo1udons affordad if to fight for socialism.
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%%& &fhm rainlists did not makc the German molution,
Wt
d d have utilked it. The revolution thrust power
hb tI& hands. They could have deepened the revolution;
b
d they hastened to liquidate it. Instead of using their
power to demolish whatever capitalist forcetr were I& they
4their power to build up and strengthen capitalism. The
business of a socidbt party is to be so prepared that it will
take advantage of every difiimlty in capitdim to further the
interests of d s m .
There is no one way in which the proletariat may get
political power. It may get political power as a result of the
utter collapse of the existing state power as in Russia; as
a result of a revolution brought about by a defeat in war
as in Germany; as a result of a successfu1 revolution as in
Spain ;or as a result of an electoral victory as in Great Britain,
T h e way to political power in derrrwratic countries will, in
dl probability, be the way of an electoral victory, if fascism
will not intervene and make an end to democracy. The problem is not so much how to get power as how to hold it, and
how to use it. Social reformism has shown that it is afraid
of power: but whoever is not ready to use power, can not
make a bid for it.
What was in the way of the parties which had power and
refused to use it? It was a false conception of democracy.
A d d b t party in power can begin its socialist work only
when it has an absolute majority behind it. Not less than 51
per cent of the votes are necessary for it. This was really
a subterfuge. It is impossible to imagine that any sdalist
could take this "St per cent" philosophy seriously l We can,
of coarse, very well imagine a situation in which a =&list
party erhauld be called upon to take over the reigns of a capitalist state without having the slightest chance of even b e
g
@
to realize its sodalist p r o m What should s m
Eialist party do under auch &cumstances7 It is clear h t
mder such stances it can do only one thing. It w
h@bcapitatism out of its difficulties, but in so doing it b e h p
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submiInternational Sa&U G x h m c e at
this year declares:".
It is not
prrtiea to attempt to straighten ottt
even to mllaboratc in such
new or original in this deCtaratioa It
the fundamental principles of s d a b m , whi
periences of the last years have proved to be more W@ th@WL
sodlsm. The &ution

..

ever.

When a German d a l democratic leader is
did not you strengthen the position of the wwEq efaaer h
Germany so that the reactionary forces could not rise 6
the usual answer is :But that would have been dictatomhip!
The fear of dictatorship has become so strong hi same
of our movement that it has led them to abandon all thoagat
of revolutionary transformation of society of any mrt. Bmt
what is the dictatorship of the proletariat? Why it is c m manism; the best example of it is Russia? Is Russia
the "best example" or an example of any End of p r o b r h n
dictatorship? No socialist d
l admit that. Due to the sped&
and unique circumstances under which the Bolshevik pafQ
a c q u i d state power, the proletarian dictatorship &era has
taken on a fotm and eontat that is esptcially adapted to
Russian conditions. The Bolshevik party has aaqairad pmm
in a country that had neither a well o r g m h d wurIdng cIa&
nor a well organized bourgeoisie, a country which had na
democratic traditions, a country that was economically
devel@ and culturally backward. Tt is natural tbat a d b
t a t d p in such o country should be quite Werent h
what a Uproletdandictatorship" would be in any other etry. What we have in Russia at present is n
of the proletariat, but a dictatorship over the
even a dictatorship of the communists over
but rather a dictatorship of a bureaucratic
communist pa*
as well as over every m e else, fs
ideal of proletarian dictatorship? Deddedlg not. No
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the mmmu&ts who refuae b tala
eoen mar the IdeaI of proletarb die
t p&y which wiI1, in one way or mother,
te m,and will proceed to use it for the bddiam, wiIl inevitably meet with opp&tim from
supporters of the present order. It will have to
Mend itself againat opcn d conceded warfare and sabo-.
It wiIl thm either suppress these oppmitions
its m t e
power, or submit to them. If it wilf suppress, it wilt use dk- .
tstorial measures (which in reality every bourgeois demo-tic state uses). If it will submit, it will simply give up its
fight for socialism. A &t
government that will p r o d
to nw t h state
~
for the building of W i s m will meet many
obstacles in its way, mch as obsolete capitalist idtutbm,
reactionary officials and d i m d bat nevertheless powerful
M t i o n a . It will have to abolish the insdtutiwa, replace
these offidds, break these tiaditionst, or submit to them. If
it submits, it is giving up its fi&t for socialism. Some wsa
haa once said, that what sofiaIi mast be prepared for h not
a revolution but a muater-~evalution. Once W s t s wilf
gain power, wen in the most legal and dunomtic mnnner,
if they will try to use this pwex to abolish capitalism thcy
will be faced w41 a b m r g d s (or fascist) counter-revoltltiw1
They will have either to suppress this counter-mlution, w be
suppressed by it In the former case, they will use dictatorid
mto dear the way for the tapbuirdhg and growth of
a r d d a l democracy; in the l a t e they will prepare the
way for fascism This is the choice before the wchliist mment On this choice depends the further deveIopment, the
fatwe successes or failures of the movement.

Since the preceding articles were written, great

ham talsen place in the international rodstlit movemctlt.
TfWe changes d d y d
m a d e t a i analysis, but k
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to be held in 19347 How diEerently the delegates to the
ference would now talk and act1
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changes that have
Genuan s d a l Democrats.

artor d t b e d by the German labor movement which lost
ifs sensed direction during the waP, was that "it took over
control of the state . sharing it, aa a matter of coume,
with the bowpob partits!' In its new program, the German
~ o d a lDemocratic Party promiges that when it again gets
state control it will oqganh "a strong revdutiqnary gom a t b a d upon, and controlled by, a revolutionary maw
Bsrty of the w o r h " . ' m e ftrst and most im-t
taak
of such a g o ~ e n t " the
, program continues, 'krill be to
me the p e r of the state to make the victory of the revolution safe, to root out any posdbiitlp of resistance." It will
also immediately undertab a series of revolutionary changes
of&tp.
Among these will be the g ' ~ u p p ~ of
o nall manQtr-revolutionary agitation"; "immediate expropriation, withotrt cangeasahn of large landed estates"; "immediate e*-tion,
without mpnsation of heavy induskies'', etc.
A d the new program further dcches :"only after the authority of the d u t i o n has been M y established and the
f d d - m p i e and political aour- of power of the ronnteriWOItttion have been wmpleteIy destroyed, w i l l the prmcss
state on the U s
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